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Abstract 
This paper presents a new measure of electoral democracy, or "polyarchy", for a global sample of 173 
countries from 1900 to the present based on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data, enabling us to 
address several deficiencies in extant measures of electoral democracy, such as Freedom House and 
Polity. The V-Dem data derive from expert polls of more than 2,600 country experts from around the 
world, with on average 5 experts rating each indicator. By measuring the five components of “Elected 
officials”, “Free and fair elections”, “Freedom of expression”, “Associational autonomy” and 
“Inclusive citizenship” separately, we anchor this new index directly in Dahl’s (1971) extremely 
influential theoretical framework, and can both show how well indicators match components as well as 
how components map the overall index. We also find that characteristics of the V-Dem country experts 
do not systematically predict their ratings on our indicators, nor differences between these ratings and 
existing measures such as FH and Polity, with which they are strongly correlated. Finally, we provide 
systematic measures of uncertainty (or measurement error) at every level. We showcase the usefulness 
of the new measure for understanding developments of electoral democracy over time, for comparing 
countries at a particular time point, and for understanding its relationship to economic modernization 
through disaggregation. 
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1. Introduction 
Democracy may mean many things, but in this paper we shall only concern ourselves with the concept 
used as an empirical yardstick by which countries, or national political systems, may be compared. More 
specifically, we shall concentrate on a particular way of understanding democracy as a yardstick, one 
that has dominated the empirical social sciences since at least the second world war. Through the 
seminal work of Schumpeter (1942), Downs (1957) and Dahl (1956, 1971), a relative consensus has 
evolved that views elections – together with the institutions that uphold the democratic qualities of 
elections – as the core of the concept. We will call this the electoral conception of democracy, to 
distinguish it from other, more idealized, conceptions – such as liberal, participatory, deliberative, or 
egalitarian democracy (see Coppedge et al. 2015a, 2016, Lindberg et al. 2014) –  that do not stress 
elections as democracy’s core institutional pillar. 
Given this conceptual point of departure, we propose a new way of measuring electoral 
democracy. This measure is based on the methodology of the Varieties of Democracy project (Coppedge 
et al. 2015d, see also www.v-dem.net), which draws on multiple expert perceptions of a large number of 
disaggregated indicators from a global sample of countries since 1900. More precisely, we use ratings 
provided by over 2,600 scholars and other experts on 36 specific indicators at country-year level to 
measure the core “institutional guarantees” in Dahl’s (1971, 1989, 1998) concept of “polyarchy.” We 
also launch an aggregate index of these components to measure electoral democracy. At all levels, we 
provide both point estimates and a measure of uncertainty. 
We argue that this new index has several advantages over the widely used existing measures 
with similar coverage, such as Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen (2000), Przeworski et al. (2000) and 
Boix et al. (2011). First, we anchor the new index directly in Dahl’s (1971) extremely influential 
theoretical framework. By measuring the five Dahlian (1998, 85) components of “Elected officials”, 
“Free and fair elections”, “Freedom of expression”, “Associational autonomy” and “Inclusive 
citizenship” separately, we can for the first time since Coppedge & Reinicke (1990) allow for an analysis 
of how these components hang together empirically. The data is public and our measure also allows for 
disaggregation, both to the level of the five components and down to the indicators constituting these. 
Second, we also allow for both minimalist and maximalist versions of electoral democracy (Munch and 
Verkuilen 2002), and can thus systematically explore for the first time how these different conceptions 
affect our estimates of democracy in the world. Third, our data generating process and aggregation 
scheme is fully transparent, and can be cross-examined. More specifically, we show below that 
characteristics of the V-Dem country experts do not systematically predict their ratings on our 
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indicators, nor differences between these ratings and existing measures such as FH and Polity, with 
which they are strongly correlated. Finally, we provide systematic measures of uncertainty (or 
measurement error) at every level. 
In the following, the first section details the conceptualization of polyarchy followed by our 
approach to measurement. The third part outlines the V-Dem methodology followed by a section on 
how we measure the components of polyarchy. The fifth section deliberates on how we aggregate these 
components into the polyarchy index. After a section probing the validity of the underlying V-Dem 
data and indices, we end by providing some empirical illustrations results to highlight the added value 
of our new measure. 
 
2. Conceptual Points of Departure: Polyarchy vs. Minimalist 
Conceptions of Democracy 
Dahl (1971, 2) famously defined democracy as “a political system one of the characteristics of which is 
the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens.” Yet he reserved this 
term, “democracy,” for an ideal system without empirical referents, instead preferring to label countries 
living up to the empirical requirements of democracy “polyarchies.” Originally eight, these 
requirements – or “institutional guarantees” – were in later work narrowed down to seven (Dahl 1989) 
and eventually six (Dahl 1998, 85). We have in turn collapsed two of these on theoretical grounds into 
the five guarantees presented in Table 11. 
 
 
 
                                                
1 The two requirements from Dahl (1971, 3) that are missing in Dahl (1998, 85) are: ”Eligibility for public office” and 
”Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference”  We agree with Dahl 
that these could be omitted, the first on the one hand because eligibility and suffrage tend to go hand in hand (as argued by 
Coppedge & Reinicke 1990, 53) , and on the other because several of the aspects of “Freedom of organization” such as 
freedom to organize political parties and for them to run in elections, captures much of the eligibility criteria. The second 
can be dropped because it is more of a summary proxy for all the other institutional requirements taken together, and not 
the least by the mechanism of free, fair, and regular multiparty elections. The remaining sixth guarantee that we include by 
collapsing it with freedom of expression is “alternative sources of information”. The latter is theoretically very closely 
connected to, and as we show empirically indistinguishable from, the former. 
  5 
Table 1. The Five Institutional Guarantees of Polyarchy 
 
 Minimalist conception: Maximalist conception: 
A. Elected officials X X 
B. Free, Fair and Frequent Elections X X 
C. Associational Autonomy X X 
D. Inclusive Citizenship  X 
E. Freedom of Expression   X 
Source: Dahl 1998, 85 (“Alternative sources of information” collapsed with “Freedom of Expression”). The “minimalist” 
conception corresponds most closely to Schumpeter (1942). 
 
Dahl’s notion of polyarchy is sometimes juxtaposed to a more “minimalist” conception of democracy 
dating back to Schumpeter’s (1942, 269) famous assertion that “the democratic method is that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” This conception is in at least two 
senses more “minimal” than Dahl’s. First in that it excludes from its definition any reference to political 
liberties.2 Second, in arguing that “disqualifications on grounds of economic status, religion and sex 
[are] compatible with democracy”, Schumpeter (1942, 244-5) clearly excluded the right to vote (or the 
extension of the suffrage) from his conception of democracy (Møller & Skaaning 2010, 268-9). In terms 
of Dahl’s (1971, 4) two famous “dimensions of democratization,” Schumpeter thus stresses 
competition or contestation at the expense of inclusiveness or participation. This implies that 
Schumpeter primarily defines democracy by reference to the first, second and third Dahlian 
institutional guarantees only (see Table 1). 
Typically, the argument in favor of minimalist conceptions is to allow the relationship between 
democracy and other components to be empirically determined rather than settled by definitional fiat. 
Boix et al. (2013, 1527), for example, argue that “by not bundling in additional elements of democratic 
practice, such as civil liberties, it allows researchers to empirically relate these elements to regime type.” 
Similarly, Przeworski et al. (2000, 34) argue in favor of excluding suffrage from their conception of 
democracy in order to “be able to test theories about the effects of participation on the performance 
and the durability of democracy.” One the one hand, such empirical considerations cannot solely 
                                                
2 As pointed out by O’Donnell (2001, 9), Schumpeter (1942, 272) allows that freedom to compete for political leadership 
”will in most cases though not in all mean a freedom of discussion for all. In particular it will normally mean a considerable 
amount of freedom of the press.” The reservations “though not in all” and “normally” to us however signal that freedom of 
discussion and the press are for Schumpeter not definitional criteria, but likely outcomes or empirical implications of having 
a democratic system. 
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override theoretical issues of conceptualization. It remains a fact that the bulk of work attempting to 
measure democracy in the world has relied on Dahl’s more maximalist conceptualization (e.g., Bollen 
1980, 1990; Coppedge & Reinicke 1990; Hadenius 1992; Gasiorowski 1996; Mainwaring et al. 2001; 
Bowman et al. 2005). On the other hand, this is a false dichotomy given adequate data and 
disaggregation. An attractive feature of the approach we are proposing is that it allows room for both 
researchers wanting to stick with the maximalist conception and those wanting to test empirical 
relationships using one of the more minimalist ones or the individual components and indicators. 
The argument against Dahlian “maximalist” conception is that too many features of the 
political system are built into the concept. Most importantly, why should a non-electoral dimension 
such as freedom of expression be made part of a measure of electoral democracy? This is a legitimate 
question, and some authors have accordingly suggested to reserve the term ”electoral democracy” for 
the more minimalist Schumpeterian conception (e.g., Möller & Skaaning 2010, 268-171; Munck 2009, 
55-56). Without denying the need for such diminished subtypes for certain analytical purposes, we 
maintain that polyarchy provides to most fully fleshed theory of what constitutes an electoral 
democracy. “By this conception,” in Diamond’s (2002, 21) words, ”democracy requires not only free, 
fair, and competitive elections, but also the freedoms that make them truly meaningful (such as freedom of 
organization and freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, and institutions to ensure 
that government policies depend on the votes and preferences of citizens)” (italics added). To avoid the 
“fallacy of electoralism” (Karl 1986), even election-centered notions of democracy need to take into 
account some non-electoral aspects, most importantly freedom of organization and expression, in order 
to ascertain that elections work as intended.3 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 O’Donnell (2001) also interprets Dahl’s concept of polyarchy as listing some attributes of elections and then adding 
certain freedoms ”deemed necessary for elections to be democratic” (12), although he then surmises that since what exact 
freedoms are required to maintain the democratic qualities of elections is an inductive question, this practice introduces a 
conceptual “can of worms” that already Schumpeter tried but failed to avoid (15). We agree with him on the first but not 
the second point. 
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3. Measurement Approach: Reflective vs. Constitutive 
Indicators of Democracy 
Whether one adopts a reflective or constitutive model of how indicators and components are related to 
higher-level concepts (Goertz 2006) is critical for how to measure the electoral concept of democracy. 
In classical measurement theory, concepts are viewed as latent constructs that give rise to, or “cause,” 
their respective observable indicators. These are thus termed “effect” or reflective indicators. A person’s 
score on an IQ test, for example, is viewed as an “effect” caused by the underlying, unobserved 
attribute “intelligence.” As Goertz (2006) points out, however, there is another “ontological” approach 
to measurement where indicators are seen as constituting the concept. By defining “human development” 
as the composite of life expectancy, level of education and economic development, for example, 
UNDP is arguing that these three components constitute the overall concept – not that they are 
“effect” indicators “caused” by it. 
Both the reflective and the constitutive view of democracy measures have been advocated.4 
Bollen (1990, 12) provides an eloquent presentation of the former view: “Conceptually, I view political 
rights and civil liberties as aspects of political democracy. I could imagine these as moving in response 
to changes in democracy. For instance, if democracy declines in a nation, I would expect this to lead to 
declines in political liberties and rights.” Democracy is thus viewed as a latent trait (Treier & Jackman 
2008), living a life of its own as it were, causing observables such as the degree of political liberties to 
move as an effect of the underlying level of democracy changes. Among others (also see Munck 2009), 
Goertz (2006, 15) advocates the opposite view in writing that “to have competitive elections is not a 
symptom of democracy, it is not caused by democracy, but rather it constitutes what democracy is.” 
The choice between viewing components and indicators as reflective or as constituent elements 
of higher-order concepts has important repercussions for aggregation (Munck 2009, 30-31). With the 
classical “effect indicators” approach that considers each indicator as at least partially substitutable and 
                                                
4 The distinction is similar to but not equivalent to the one between cause and effect indicators, or reflective vs. formative 
measurement models (Bollen 1989, 64-5; cf. Munck 2009, 148 n. 17). We prefer the term “constituent” to “cause” or 
“formative” indicator, however, since the language of causes and effects implies that the relationship is still somehow an 
empirical one. The virtue of Goertz (2009) approach is to highlight the fact that the relationship is theoretical or conceptual, 
not empirical. 
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“caused” by the latent trait, the conventional aggregation rule is to take the average.5 With the 
constituent approach, by contrast, a theory of the relation between the indicators, and between them 
and the main concept must inform the choice of aggregation rule(s). If each indicator is viewed as 
perfectly substitutable for the others, and hence each on its own is a sufficient condition for the higher-
level construct, taking the maximum is the warranted aggregation rule. But if theory specifies that each 
indicator is a non-substitutable and hence each is a necessary condition, the aggregation rule should be 
either taking the minimum or multiplying the indicators (Goertz 2009, 39-44, 11; cf. Munck & 
Verkuilen 2002, 24; Munck 2009, 32). 
For our new measure of polyarchy, we argue in favor of a joint approach in which some parts 
of the higher-level construct are best measured with reflective indicators “caused” by a higher-level 
component, whereas other components should be treated as “constituted” by its indicators, on 
theoretical grounds. We thus argue in favor of the approach that makes most theoretical sense in each 
case, instead of a one-size-fits-all general solution. 
 
 
4. The V-Dem Methodology 
The large literature on existing attempts to measure polyarchy, or electoral democracy, has been 
reviewed extensively elsewhere (Munck & Verkuilen 2002; Hadenius & Teorell 2005; Munch 2009; 
Coppedge et al. 2011). Suffice to say here that in our view no extant measure fulfills all of the following 
five essential criteria: (1) covering all components of Dahl’s concept of polyarchy (as listed in Table 1) 
while; (2) providing disaggregated data to check dimensionality and allow users to “drill down” in order 
to evaluate what lower-level changes account for the shifts in higher-level indices, or what lower-level 
components that drive aggregate correlations; (3) for a global sample of countries and across long 
swaths of time; (4) using transparent data generating processes and aggregation rules; and (5) providing 
estimates of measurement uncertainty.  
To be sure, selected extant measures live up to some of these criteria. Coppedge & Reinicke 
(1990), for example, provide measures of  almost all of Dahl’s components, on a global sample using 
transparent aggregation rules – but only for the year of 1985, and with no measures of uncertainty. 
Przeworski et al. (2000), as well as Vanhanen (2000), are renowned for their incisive coding, clear 
                                                
5 Or a weighted average, with the weights made up of the strength of the “causal” relationship between each indicator and 
the higher-level construct (such as factor loadings). 
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aggregation rules, and reliance on strictly observable data. They also provide great geographic and 
temporal coverage – but again with no measures of uncertainty, and only measure a minimalist subset 
of the concept of polyarchy. Much the same goes for Boix et al. (2011), except that their exact coding 
rules for determining whether elections are “free and fair” are not fully transparent. Treier & Jackman 
(2008), finally, in one of the few efforts to furnish the point estimates of democracy with confidence 
intervals reflecting measurement uncertainty (cf. Pemstein et al. 2010), suffer from the Polity data’s 
limitations in terms of its minimalist conception of democracy, unjustified aggregation rules, and non-
transparent coding scheme. 
There is thus a need for a new measure of polyarchy that can live up to all theoretical and 
methodological criteria simultaneously. We argue that the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem for short) data 
makes this possible. Three features in particular underpins this claim (for a fuller description of the V-
Dem methodology, see Coppedge et al. 2015d, Pemstein et al. 2015). The first feature is radical 
disaggregation: we translate the highest-level principles of democracy into over 350 detailed questions 
with well-defined response categories or measurement scales. Although these have been designed to tap 
into a variety of conceptions of democracy, this still means we have constructed the polyarchy scale 
presented below on the basis of 36 individual variables. This not only implies that we measure all 
components of Dahl’s polyarchy concept, but also that each component save one is measured with 
multiple indicators, enhancing reliability and providing a basis for tests of dimensionality. 
Second, covering 173 country units across the entire globe (the list of countries covered is 
displayed in Appendix A), the bulk of the indicators stems from data collected from country experts, 
mostly academics from each country in question.6 These experts have been recruited based on their 
academic or other credentials as field experts in the area7 they code, on their seriousness of purpose 
and impartiality. The target is that at least 5 experts rate each indicator for each country and year going 
back to 1900. This means that more than 2,600 experts in all have helped us gather the data. 
While we select experts carefully, they clearly exhibit varying levels of reliability and bias. 
Therefore – and this is the third unique feature of V-Dem – we use Bayesian item response theory 
(IRT) modeling techniques to estimate latent country coding unit characteristics from the collection of 
                                                
6 A notable feature of the V-Dem data is that we code a ”country” throughout its history also as a semi-sovereign unit (until 
1900). This implies that most colonies, and also some current non-independent territories such as Kosovo and the 
Palestines, are included in the sample. 
7 The questionnaire is subdivided into 11 different areas of expertise, and most experts code a cluster of three such areas. 
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expert ratings (see Pemstein et al. 2015). The underpinnings of these measurement models are 
straightforward: they use patterns of cross-rater (dis)agreement to estimate variations in reliability and 
systematic differences in threshold between ordinal response categories to adjust estimates of the latent 
concept in question. Since most coders rate one country only in areas based on their expertise, we also 
utilize “lateral” coders who rate multiple countries for a limited time period, as well as “bridge” coders 
who code the full time series for more than one country. As of December 2015, we have over 360 
bridge coders – about 14 percent of all country experts – who have coded 6.1 surveys for 2.1 countries 
on average, as well as more than 350 country experts (about 15%) who have performed lateral coding, 
covering on average of 5.5 countries and 6.3 surveys. By this, every country is directly or indirectly 
connected across all surveys. Essentially, this allows us to mitigate the potential incomparability of 
coders’ thresholds and enhance cross-national comparability. 
 
 
5. Measuring the Parts: Five Components of Polyarchy 
Our description of the V-Dem measure of polyarchy proceeds as follows. In this section, we discuss 
the five component indices, and the indicators used to measure them, corresponding to Dahl’s 
“institutional guarantees” presented in Table 1. In the next section, we present the aggregation rules for 
combining them and the resulting index of electoral democracy (polyarchy). 
 
A. Elected executive 
 
This index measures whether the chief executive is elected, either directly through popular elections or 
indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive. In the literature 
on measuring democracy this concept is also referred to as the “effectiveness” (Hadenius 1992, 49) or 
“decisiveness” (O’Donnell 2001, 13) of elections. A “popular election” is thus minimally defined and 
also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, “appointment” by 
legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss.8  
                                                
8 The rationale for this is that counting dismissal powers would introduce a systematic “bias” in favor of parliamentary 
systems, which typically are the only systems relying on institutionalized powers of dismissal over and above the power to 
appoint or elect the chief executive. In presidential systems, for example, there typically is no recall vote at the national level. 
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The logic  behind the construct is schematically portrayed in Figure 1. Unlike the following component 
indices, the index is based on a set of constitutive indicators that logically define the overall construct, 
regardless of whether the individual indicators hang together empirically or not. This is motivated out 
of purely theoretical concerns. 
 
Figure 1. The Logical Structure of the Elected Officials Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are six different links of appointment/selection to take into account, all of which we 
scale to vary from 0 to 1. First and second, whether the head of state (a1) and/or head of government 
(a2) is directly elected (1) or not (0). Third, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected (b), 
measured as the proportion of legislators elected (if legislature is unicameral), or the weighted average 
of the proportion elected for each house, with the weight defined by which house is dominant (if 
legislature is bicameral).9 Fourth and fifth, whether the head of state (c1) and/or head of government 
(c2) is appointed by the legislature (1), or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the 
appointment of the head of state (1), or not (0). Sixth, whether the head of government is appointed by 
the head of state (d=1) or not (d=0).  
                                                                                                                                                            
Also, in the assembly independent (albeit very unusual) Swiss system type, the legislature lacks the power to dismiss the 
cabinet. 
9 In terms of the V-Dem variables (see Appendix B): b=v2lgello (converted to fractions) in unicameral legislatures 
(v2lgbicam==1), and a weighted average of v2lgello and v2lgelecup (converted to fractions) in bicameral legislatures 
(v2lgbicam==2), where v2lgdomchm_ord/4 defines the weight. In the current version of V-Dem, no distinction is made 
between indirectly elected and appointed legislatures, which are thus treated equally. We hope to implement such a 
distinction in future versions. 
HOS HOG 
LEGISLATURE  
(upper/lower) 
ELECTORATE 
c1 c2 
a1 
b 
d 
a2 
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In polities with unified executives, that is, where the head of state is also the head of 
government (Elgie 1998; Siaroff 2003), the complexity of this conceptual scheme reduces to the links 
a1 and b*c. Since these are considered perfect substitutes (either a directly elected president or a president 
elected by a directly elected parliament suffices), the index value is thus achieved at by taking the 
maximum value of the two. In dual systems, where there is both a head of state and a head of 
government, the chief executive is determined by comparing the two executives’ power over the 
appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. If the head of state and head of government share 
equal powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, the index averages across the 
extent to which both are directly or indirectly elected.10  
As Figure C1 of Appendix C reveals, the resulting index (called v2x_accex) has a bimodal 
distribution. The rare values falling between 1 and 0 are mostly bicameral systems where the upper 
house is not directly elected, but also include cases such as Burma/Myanmar that (currently) has a 
unified executive with a president elected by parliament, in which only 75 % of the seats are directly 
elected. 
Three potential limitations of the index should be noted. First, since this is an index of whether 
the executive is appointed through elections, the extent to which non-elected “accountability groups” 
(such as the military) may affect dismissal of the executive, or can veto important domestic policy 
proposals, has not been taken into account. Secondly, indirectly elected legislators, common in the 
upper house of federal systems, are treated the same as appointed legislators (that is, as unelected). 
Finally, since this index concentrates on the election/appointment of the chief executive, presidential 
systems with reserved, unelected seats in the legislature are not being penalized. For example, 8 out of 
150 seats in the unicameral national assembly of Zambia, one third of the deputies of the “House of 
Elders” in Afghanistan, as well as 7 out of 47 seats in the “Senate” in Kazakhstan are presidential 
appointees, but since the chief executive in these systems (the president) is still directly elected, the 
index assumes the value 1. 
                                                
10 In technical terms, define hosw as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government 
(v2exhoshog==1), hosw=1. In dual systems (v2exhoshog==0), if the head of state has more power than the head of 
government over the appointment (v2exdfcbhs_rec>v2exdjcbhg) and dismissal (v2exdfdmhs>v2exdfdshg) of cabinet 
ministers, then hosw=1; if the reverse is true, hosw=0. If the head of state has more appointment 
(v2exdfcbhs_rec>v2exdjcbhg) but the head of government more dismissal power (v2exdfdmhs<v2exdfdshg), or vice versa, 
hosw=.5. Define the weight for the head of government as hogw=1-hosw. The index is then defined as hosw*[max(a1, 
b*c1)]+hogw*[max(a1*d, b*c1*d, a2, b*c2)]. 
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B. Clean elections 
 
The second component, which Dahl (1998, 85) calls “free, fair and frequent” elections, is designed to 
capture the level of integrity of elections measured as the absence of manipulation and bias in the 
administration of elections (e.g. Calingaert 2006, Lehoucq 2003, Bermeo 2010, Birch 2011, Donno 
2013, Simpser 2013, Kelley 2013, Scheduler 2002, 2013, Norris 2015, van Ham and Lindberg 
2015). Disregarding the “frequency” aspect, since that would build an unnecessary temporal aspect into 
the concept of polyarchy, this component is thus in essence tapping into whether an election could be 
considered free from manipulation. Or in other words, whether the election is “clean”. 
The V-Dem dataset includes six indicators pertaining to this latent trait, rated by the country 
experts for each election (see Appendix B on exact question wording and response categories).11 These 
measure the extent of (a) registration irregularities, (b) vote buying, (c) ballot fraud and intentional 
irregularities, (d) government-induced intimidation of opposition candidates, (e) other types of election 
violence (not instigated by the government or ruling party), as well as (f) an overall assessment of 
whether the election, all things considered, could be considered “free and fair.” Finally, two indicators 
are measured on annual basis: The (g) autonomy and (h) capacity of the election administration body 
(EMB) to conduct well-run elections. 
We view the aggregated country-year data on these eight indicators as reflective indicators 
caused by the unobserved latent trait “clean elections”, and therefore partially substitutable. To test this 
measurement proposition, we ran a Bayesian factor analysis model and the results are reported in Table 
2.12 As can be seen, the vote buying and election violence (not conducted by the government) 
indicators have somewhat weaker loadings and a larger share of their variance unaccounted for 
(uniqueness). By and large, however, the fit to a unidimensional model seems adequate. 
                                                
11 If legislative (lower house or constituent assembly) and presidential elections were held concurrently, the questions 
pertain to both of them. If multiple elections (or rounds of elections) were held in the same year, however, we asked about 
each election separately. For present purposes, the estimates have been averaged across multiple elections within a year to 
arrive at country election-year estimates. Election types and dates were compiled from multiple sources (see codebook at 
www.v-dem.net). 
12 To run the Bayesian factor analysis models, we have used the factanal() command in the MCMC package for R (Martin et 
al. 2014). We owe thanks to Yi-ting Wang and Eitan Tzelgov at University of Gothenburg for helping us out in setting up 
the R code for these analyses. 
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Table 2. Measuring Clean Elections (BFA estimates) 
 
Indicator Loadings (Λ) Uniqueness (Ψ) 
Proper voter registry (v2elrgstry) .811 .344 
Vote buying (v2elvotbuy) .680 .538 
Ballot fraud/vote irregularity (v2elirreg) .873 .240 
Government intimidation (v2elintim) .866 .251 
Other electoral violence (v2elpeace) .656 .570 
Overall judgment “free & fair” (v2elfrfair) .892 .207 
EMB autonomy (v2elembaut) .871 .243 
EMB capacity (v2elembcap) .809 .347 
Note: Entries are factor loadings and uniqueness from a normal theory Bayesian factor analysis model; n=3,271 election 
years. 
 
The index of clean elections is based on the point estimates from this Bayesian factor analysis 
model (distributed as in Figure C2), accompanied by measures of uncertainty.13 Since this index is only 
observed for election years, however, we face the issue of how to extrapolate its values over time. 
Although one could contemplate extrapolation rules that take election frequency into account (for 
example by adding a yearly depreciation rate, such as .95), the approach taken here is to simply repeat 
the index values from the last election until either another election occurs or there is an “electoral 
interruption,” defined as either (i) the dissolution, shut-down, replacement or in any sense termination 
of the elected body (such as after coups or violent takeovers of the government, etc), or (ii) that the 
elected body in question, while still intact or in place, is no longer to be appointed through (direct) 
elections (as after an autogolpe).14 
A thornier issue concerns what value to assign to the index during periods of such electoral 
interruptions. Recall that, being based on the scores from the item response theory measurement 
model, the index has no natural zero point and a theoretically defined minimum score cannot be 
identified. Our solution is first (this step pertains to all V-Dem indices composed using BFAs)  to 
                                                
13 More specifically, we randomly select 100 draws from each variable’s posterior distribution (see Pemstein et al 2015 for 
on the measurement model), and use a unidimensional Bayesian factor analysis (BFA) to measure this latent concept 
sequentially for each randomly-selected draw in each grouping of variables. We then combine the posterior distributions of 
the latent factor scores in each variable group to yield the latent factor scores. In all analyses the variables generally load 
highly on the underlying factor, and by this procedure we take full advantage of the estimates of uncertainty at the indicator 
level, to provide realistic (not overly narrow) estimates of uncertainty at the component-level. 
14 The V-Dem dataset has a specific indicator for this, capturing electoral interruptions (v2x_elecreg). 
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convert the index score to a probability (0-1) score by using the normal cumulative distribution 
function (cdf). Second, we substitute all values during periods of electoral interruption with zero. This 
transformed index score could thus be interpreted as the probability of observing the corresponding 
BFA point estimate score or lower (a BFA score of –1.65 thus corresponds to a probability of .05, a 
score of 0 to a probability of .5, and so on). Figure C3 (of Appendix C) shows how this transformed 0-
1 index (called v2xel_frefair) map onto the original BFA estimates. As can be seen, what the normal cdf 
accomplishes is a non-linear transformation that slightly compresses the original BFA estimates at the 
higher and lower ends. We believe this distortion of the original BFA estimate is tolerable. 
 
C. Freedom of Organization 
 
The first two component indices of elected officials and clean elections does not take into account the 
degree of pluralism. They could at least in theory reach high values even in a totalitarian, single-party 
state. This is why we need a separate index capturing the degree of what Dahl (1998, 85) calls 
“associational autonomy,” or freedom of organization. As a component of polyarchy, the core of this 
construct is party-centered: are political parties free to form; operate autonomously from the ruling 
regime; and field candidates in national elections? In addition, associational autonomy in the political 
sphere also requires that there be no barriers to the entry and exit, or state repression of, a wider set of 
civil society organizations providing alternative means for voice and political activity making policy 
depend on votes and preferences.15 We have thus opted for the set of reflective indicators of freedom 
of association indicated in Table 3. They clearly load on a single underlying dimension with the 
somewhat weaker loading for civil society repression as the only partial exception.16 The resulting 
index (called v2x_frassoc), again rescaled to 0-1 through the normal cdf, is bimodally distributed (see 
Figure C5). 
                                                
15 In this particular respect, however, the dividing line between a more minimalist ”Schumpeterian”, which would most 
likely argue in favor of ignoring these additional civil society features, and a more maximalist ”Dahlian” concept of freedom 
of organization cuts within one of Dahl’s five components. For empirical purposes, this distinction makes very little 
difference however: a thinner freedom of organization index only based on the first four electoral indicators correlates at .99 
with the thicker version we opted for. 
16 Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, we face the same extrapolation problem as for 
the clean elections index above. The solution we have adopted (again) is to repeat the values observed in the last election 
and then replace all observations with 0 during electoral interruptions. 
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Table 3. Measuring Freedom of Organization (BFA estimates) 
 
Indicator Loadings (Λ) Uniqueness (Ψ) 
Party ban (v2psparban) .898 .194 
Barriers to parties (v2psbars) .911 .170 
Opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut_fill) .889 .210 
Elections multiparty (v2elmulpar_fill) .850 .278 
CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) .887 .213 
CSO repression (v2csreprss) .883 .305 
Note: Entries are factor loadings and uniqueness from a normal theory Bayesian factor analysis model; n=16,196 country-
years. 
 
D. Inclusive Citizenship 
 
For the purpose of measuring electoral democracy, Dahl’s (1971, 1989, 1998) component called 
“inclusive citizenship” in effect amounts to the extension of the suffrage. The V-Dem indicator is 
based on an estimate of the proportion of adult citizens eligible to vote, roughly based on the Paxton et 
al. (2003) methodology (see Appendix B, section D, for further details), measured for all country units 
since 1900. The resulting 0-1 index (called v2x_suffr) is again bimodally distributed (see Figure C6).  
 
E. Freedom of Expression 
 
Finally, Dahl’s concept of polyarchy includes some non-electoral aspects, most conspicuously having to 
do with the freedom of expression. Staying true to his widely accepted concept necessitates borrowing 
some indicators from the “liberal” sphere for this component. A core set of indicators captures media 
freedom (Behmer 2009) such as active state censorship of print/broadcast media, media self-
censorship, and harassment of journalists. In addition, there should be freedom of discussion in society 
at large, for both men and women (Skaaning 2009).17 Also included in this index are four indicators 
more geared towards measuring content rather than government restrictions. Following Dahl (1971) it 
could be called “alternative sources of information”: whether the media is biased against opposition 
                                                
17 One could imagine an even more “maximalist” version of the freedom of expression component also including two 
indicators of physical integrity rights (as is done by, for example, Hadenius 1992). On the one hand, it makes sense to say 
that a government that practices torture or murder opposition supporters are clearly violating the freedom of expression de 
facto. On the other, one might think of these as two restrictions on what governments can do, and instead be treated as part 
of the liberal-democratic conception. This is the approach followed here. 
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parties and candidates, whether major print and broadcast outlets routinely criticize the government, 
and whether they represent a wide range of political perspectives, as well as general repression of 
cultural and academic expressions of political dissent. 
Table 4 demonstrates that these nine (reduced to eight) indicators are well conceived as partially 
substitutable, reflective indicators caused by the unobserved latent trait “freedom of expression”. 
Hence, our index of freedom of expression (called v2x_freexp_thick) is based on the point estimates 
from this Bayesian factor analysis model. To allow for simple averaging or multiplication as aggregation 
rules (see below), we have again converted this index score to a probability (0-1) score by using the 
normal cdf, resulting in a 0-1 scaled component index distributed as in Figure C7. 
 
Table 4. Measuring Freedom of Expression (BFA estimates) 
 
Indicator Loadings (Λ) Uniqueness (Ψ) 
Print/broadcast censorship (v2mecenefm) .900 .190 
Harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn) .879 .228 
Media self-censorship (v2meslfcen) .887 .214 
Freedom of academic/cultural expr. (v2clacfree) .844 .288 
Freedom of discussion (v2cldiscm+v2cldiscw) .893 .202 
Media bias (v2mebias) .928 .140 
Print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit) .924 .146 
Print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange) .920 .153 
Note: Entries are factor loadings and uniqueness from a normal theory Bayesian factor analysis model; all loadings have been 
inverted from negative to positive values; n=15,594 country-years. 
 
 
6. Measuring the Whole: Aggregating the Components 
Before delving into the question of how these five separately measured components of polyarchy 
should best be aggregated, it might prove useful to know how they co-vary. The lower diagonal in 
Table 5 displays the correlation coefficients using the entire set of country-year observations. The 
covariation is moderate to strong in most instances, but one particular cluster of stronger associations 
stands out: clean elections, freedom of organization, and freedom of expression. Both the elected 
executive index and suffrage indicator show systematically lower correlation to these three components. 
One could suspect this pattern to be the result of the zeros we impose on the clean elections index and 
on the multiparty elections indicator of the freedom of organization index for periods of electoral 
interruptions. The upper diagonal in Table 5 therefore presents the correlations for election-years only. 
As expected, the correlation with the indices of clean elections and freedom of organization becomes 
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significantly weaker. Yet, the cluster with stronger bivariate correlations remain, separating the elected 
executive and suffrage components on the one hand from the clean elections, freedom of organization 
and freedom of expression components on the other. 
 
Table 5. Correlations among Polyarchy Components 
 
  
Elected 
Officials 
 
Clean 
Elections 
 
Freedom of 
Organization 
 
 
Suffrage 
Freedom 
of 
Expression 
Elected 
Officials  
 
 
 
.163 
 
.280 
 
.300 
 
.306 
Clean 
Elections  
 
.604 
 
 
 
.756 
 
.228 
 
.769 
Freedom of 
Organization 
 
.577 
 
.801 
 
 
 
.145 
 
.923 
 
Suffrage 
 
.589 
 
.497 
 
.412 
 
 
 
.178 
Freedom of 
Expression 
 
.540 
 
.774 
 
.924 
 
.386 
 
Note: Entries are correlation coefficients, in the lower diagonal for n=15,432 country-years, in the upper diagonal for 
n=3,231 election years. 
 
The results indicate that polyarchy is multidimensional,18 as argued by Coppedge & Reinicke 
(1990) and Coppedge, Alvarez & Maldonado (2008). This in turn complicates the choice of which 
aggregation rule to apply. Had the correlations between all components been strong and consistent, the 
exact choice of aggregation rule would matter less. Since the different components demonstrably point 
in slightly different directions for different countries and time periods, however, the way we combine 
information from all of them will be of larger consequence for the resulting index value. 
As argued above, theoretical considerations should take precedence over empirical in the choice 
of aggregation rules. The first and most important question is thus whether the five components are 
reflective indicators being “caused” by an underlying polyarchy trait, or if they are constitutive of that 
construct. As it turns out, the literature on electoral democracy and how it should be measured is 
divided on this issue. On one hand, there is a strong rationale in the literature for treating the 
components as constitutive elements. More precisely, as argued by Przeworski et al. (2000) and even 
                                                
18 In a Bayesian factor analysis model on these six measures, the fit to a one-dimensional model is decent (but with elected 
officials and suffrage having weaker loadings). If the model is re-run on election years only, however, the fit is utterly poor, 
clearly suggesting a two-dimensional solution. 
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more clearly so by Munck (2009) and Boix et al. (2013), these components should be considered as non-
compensatory, necessary conditions for polyarchy. In other words, the degree of suffrage is not 
relevant if there is no freedom of organization, if the election results are completely fabricated, or if the 
executive is not elected. Similarly, the freedom and fairness of elections should not count if only a tiny 
fraction of the population is enfranchised, and so on. Theoretical guidance thus rule out taking the 
maximum as the aggregation rule, since that is tantamount to treating them as substitutable and each 
component as a sufficient condition for polyarchy. Theory also speaks against the use of simple (or 
weighted) averaging for aggregation, since it implies that high scores on one component at least 
partially compensates for low scores on another.  
Remains then two viable aggregation rules, which in the literature are typically considered the 
most appropriate for capturing a set of necessary conditions: either multiplication, as favored by Munck 
& Verkuilen (2002, 24) and Munck (2009, 32, 40-51), or taking the minimum, as favored by Bowman et 
al. (2005, 956) and Goertz (2006, 111-115). With dichotomous measures these two aggregation rules 
reduce to the exact same thing, but with graded information this is generally not the case. We agree that 
from the perspective of fuzzy set/Boolean algebra, the minimum is the most strict interpretation of 
what a necessary condition implies. But an important drawback is that the value of a single indicator 
completely determines the aggregated index value. The relative virtue of multiplication is that it 
combines information from all constitutive elements and hence relies on and retains more information. 
When all index components are scaled from 0-1, as in our case, it is also fairly easily interpretable, with 
each component indicator working as a weight variable, as it were, for the others. 
According to the “constitutive” logic, then, what might be called the Multiplicative Polyarchy 
Index (MPI) is constructed as follows:  
 
(1) MPI=Elected Officials*Clean Elections*Freedom of Organization*Suffrage*Freedom of Expression 
 
By the logic of multiplication, a low score on any of the component indices suppresses the value 
of the overall index. As a result, the distribution of this index is heavily skewed towards zero (see the 
upper left quadrant of Figure 2). The measurement uncertainty of the lower-level component indices 
are propagated into this component index by the same aggregation rule. Since both Elected Officials 
and Suffrage are currently assumed to be measured without error, this means that the standard errors 
from the BFA posteriors of the Clean Elections, the Freedom of Organization and the Freedom of 
Expression Indices are multiplied.   
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Figure 2. Aggregating to Polyarchy 
 
 
 
However, there is also a second well established strand in the literature on how to measure 
electoral democracy going back to Bollen (1980), Coppedge & Reinicke (1990) and Hadenius (1992). It 
argues that the polyarchy components as independent reflections (“effects”) of the same underlying 
construct. From this perspective, the aggregation rule should thus be additive rather than multiplicative. 
This logic seems to have its strongest theoretical rationale when it comes to the components based on 
“freedoms” of different sorts, particularly with respect to O’Donnell & Schmitter’s (1986) concept of 
“liberalization” – the phase in a transition to democracy when the first opening of the authoritarian 
regime occurrs (such as a lifting of media censure, of bans on political parties and wider acceptance for 
expressions of popular discontent), before the first “founding election” has been held. If the extent to 
which such “liberalizations” should count is made conditional on the electoral side of the equation – as 
implied by the multiplicative logic – then we will not be able to observe them in the data. The additive 
or averaging logic, however, allows such openings to be counted in and of themselves. 
Yet as already Dahl (1971) argued, and as has been recently demonstrated also by Coppedge et 
al. (2008) and Miller (2013), there have been other paths to the installation of partial polyarchy. Another 
prominent such path has been the introduction of executive elections with universal suffrage, but with 
severe electoral manipulation, little or no competition at the polls or in society at large, and with severe 
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repression of the freedom of expression. In effect, it is the existence of this other mostly Marxist-
Leninist or post-Communist mode of institutionalizing the trappings of electoral democracy – without 
its safeguards, as it were – that is driving the low correlations between elected officials and suffrage, on 
the one hand, and the other three polyarchy components in Table 5. If we were to generalize the 
additive logic to the full set of components, these two different paths would weigh approximately as 
much in the resulting index. While recognizing the value of an aggregation rule that also lets the 
polyarchy components influence the overall score independent of each other, we therefore favor a 
slightly adjusted approach, by letting the two more “façade-like” components (elected officials and 
suffrage) together weigh half as much as their more “liberal” and hard-fought counterparts (clean 
elections, freedom of organization and expression).19 
 
An Additive Polyarchy Index (API) is then constructed as follows:  
 
(2) API=[(Elected Officials+Suffrage)+2*(Clean Elections+Freedom of Organization+Freedom of 
Expression)]/8 = .125*Elected Officials+.125*Suffrage +.25*Freedom of Organization +.25* Clean 
Elections +.25*Freedom of Expression 
 
The resulting index is mostly bimodally distributed, as shown in the upper right quadrant of 
Figure 2. The measurement uncertainty is again taken into consideration by the same rule, implying that 
the standard errors from the BFA estimates of Clean Elections are averaged with the standard errors of 
Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Organization.  
The lower left quadrant of Figure 2 contrasts the two aggregation rules. In essence, they 
discriminate at two different ends of the underlying electoral democracy scale. Thus, what the additive 
index mostly does is to differentiate different degrees of democracy at the lower end of the 
multiplicative scale. Even when the latter is zero, the additive index can achieve as high a score as .77. 
Conversely, the multiplicative index mostly discriminates among countries already achieving high values 
on the additive scale. Thus, the variation on the multiplicative scale is from .18 to .94 when the additive 
scale is above .80.  
                                                
19 The authors wish to thank Carl-Henrik Knutsen, Oslo University, for intellectual assistance in devising this aggregation 
rule. The assignment of weights can also be supported empirically by fitting a single-factor BFA to the components (see 
former footnote). The loadings of elected officials and suffrage is then roughly half that of freedom of organization, 
freedom of expression and freedom of organization (results available upon request). 
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Since both the multiplicative and the additive logic has support in the literature, and since they 
evidently have the virtue of discriminating at different ends of the spectrum that one would want to 
measure in full, we argue that a compromise – more specifically, the average – between the two is the 
preferred solution. 
 
The V-Dem polyarchy index is thus constructed by averaging (1) and (2), or more precisely:20 
 
(3) Polyarchy =  
.5 MPI + 0.5 API 
=  .5(Elected Officials*Clean Elections*Freedom of Organization*Suffrage*Freedom of Expression) 
+(1/16Elected Officials + 1/8Clean Elections + 1/8 Freedom of Organization + 1/16 Suffrage + 1/8 
Freedom of Expression) 
 
=  .5(Elected Officials*Clean Elections*Freedom of Organization*Suffrage*Freedom of Expression) 
+.0625*Elected Officials+.125*Clean Elections+.125*Freedom of Organization +.0625*Suffrage 
+.125*Freedom of Expression 
 
The measurement uncertainty is again propagated into this overall index by averaging the 
standard errors from the API and MPI. As shown in the lower right quadrant of Figure 2, this index is 
still positively skewed, but far less so than the multiplicative version. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 Due to missing data on the media indicators in parts of the world prior to 1946, we have in this index also imputed 
missing values from a version of the index not based on these indicators. 
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7. Validating the Polyarchy Index 
Following McMann, Pemstein, Teorell, Zimmerman and Lindberg (2016), there are two fundamentally 
different ways in which we could provide positive evidence for the validity of the polyarchy index based 
on the output of the data generating process.21 The first is to compare the ratings of different country 
experts for the same indicators, countries and years; the second to compare these coder-level ratings, as 
well as the aggregated index at the country-year level, to other similar measures of electoral democracy 
from other datasets. Under the general heading of “convergent validity” (Campbell and Fiske 1959), 
agreement among coders or among datasets could both be considered as evidence of measurement 
validity. Moreover, following Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014), understanding the sources of disagreement 
can provide an additional tool for assessing validity. 
 
Comparing coders 
Assuming that our experts exercises independent judgment when translating their perceptions of the 
world into numerical ratings (Schedler 2012), coder agreement could be interpreted as a sign of validity. 
As Steenbergen & Marks put it:  
 
What would happen if our worst fears about expert judgments were to materialize? We would 
find different experts judging different objects, on different dimensions, at different points in 
time… Absent such conditions, high variance would be the necessary consequence of experts 
basing their judgments on different foundations. As a corollary, the correlation between expert 
judgments would be reduced. The key to assessing expert judgments, then, is to assess the 
variance in those judgments (2007, 351). 
 
In this spirit, Table 6 decomposes the variance in the 23 expert-coded indicators (out of the 36 in 
total) underlying the polyarchy index: clean elections (8), freedom of organization (6), and freedom of 
expression (9). Results are pooled across indicators for each component, controlling for country- and 
year-fixed effects. Expressed as standard deviations, the random effects are measured on the same 
ordinal 0-4 scale as the original indicators to ease interpretation. Overall they do not suggest 
conspicuously high levels of disagreement among our country experts. One should also recall that a 
decent share of this “raw” coder disagreement is known to be a reflection of varying thresholds for 
how to map perceptions on to the ordinal coding categories in the survey, and that the measurement 
                                                
21 A third approach is ”case face validation” (McMann et al. 2016), that is, to compare the ratings with the qualitative 
literature on democracy in a particular country or set of countries. This is an approach not pursued in this paper. 
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model corrects a substantial share of this variance when aggregating these raw scores to the country-
year level (Pemstein et al. 2015).  
 
Table 6. Variance decomposition of coder disagreement 
 Clean elections Freedom of organization 
Freedom of 
expression 
Grand mean 1.40*** 2.23*** 1.65*** 
 (.038 (.060) (.059) 
Coder-random effects .511*** .409*** .544*** 
 (.015) (.019) (.013) 
Indicator-random effect .802*** .904*** .591*** 
 (.007) (.009) (.005)     
No of indicators 8 6 9 
No of experts 1292 1863 1687 
No of observations 288,910 438,269 725,251 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Note: Entries are variance components expressed as standard deviations, with standard errors in parentheses. Country- and 
year-fixed effects included but omitted from the table. Estimates obtained from the “mixed” command in Stata13. 
 
Granted that country experts disagree at times, is there meaningful variation in that incongruity? 
Arguably, we should expect coders to disagree more, the more difficult the coding task (Steenbergen 
and Marks 2007; Coma and van Ham 2015). In the V-Dem data, we may distinguish at least three 
sources of difficulty (McMann et al. 2016). First, all else equal, judging indicators of electoral democracy 
should be more difficult further back in time, when experts cannot rely as much on their academic and 
lived experience. Second, and relatedly, difficulty should increase when there is little independent 
information from which to form ones judgment. Third, extreme conditions should be more easily 
identifiable than the “muddled middle”, hence coders should be likely to disagree more at intermediate 
levels of whatever aspect of electoral democracy they are assessing. This third expectation may work 
counter to the first to the extent that the situation in many countries was clearly “bad” in terms of 
democratic aspects in the early years of the 20th century. 
In Table 7, we test these three propositions by regressing the country-year standard deviation in 
coder ratings, pooled across the same 23 expert-coded indicators as in Table 6. We present results by 
component controlling for indicator-fixed effects (not displayed in the table). We also control for the 
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number of coders that may in itself be a systematic driver of the amount of disagreement.22 All three 
expectations are borne out by evidence. Coders disagree more when coding electoral democracy 
indicators further back in time, when there is less available media information, and at intermediate 
levels of the indicators they are assessing. The only exception is the insignificant estimate for year for 
the clean elections indicators. We believe this is because election quality is difficult to assess whatever 
the slice of history (at least when holding the amount of available information constant). We conclude 
that the level of coder disagreement varies in a meaningful and predictable way, something that lends 
further support for the validity of the V-Dem data. 
 
Table 7. Predicting coder disagreement 
  Clean elections 
Freedom of 
organization 
Freedom of 
expression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Year –.000 –.001*** –.001** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Media access –.003*** –.003*** –.003*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.000) 
Level .053*** –.052*** .030*** 
 (.011) (.010) (.008) 
Level2 –.112*** –.097*** –.083*** 
 (.006) (.005) (.003) 
No of coders .006** .010** .019*** 
 (.003) (.005) (.005)     
Mean standard deviation .860 .804 .794 
No of indicators 8 6 9     
Adjusted R-squared .289 .331 .334 
No of countries 171 173 173 
No of observations 49,390 80,450 139,046 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Note: Entries are regression coefficients, with Standard errors, clustered on countries, in parentheses. Indicator-fixed effects 
included but omitted from the table. 
 
As a final test comparing coder estimates, following Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell (2012), 
we assess if coder characteristics systematically affect ratings. These characteristics, deriving from the 
V-Dem post-survey questionnaire that all country experts were asked to fill out, are both sociological 
                                                
22 This is particularly important when considering the lateral coding performed by a large number of coders for many 
countries, all in 2012. This means that the number of coders for most countries is higher, or much higher for that particular 
year. 
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and ideological in nature. We control for gender (female=1, male=0), age (in years, also including the 
squared polynomial), level of education (PhD=1, 0=less than PhD), employment (1=government, 
0=other), whether the expert was born in or resides in the country he or she is coding (1=yes, 0=no), 
as well as whether the expert is of “Western” origin or not. Moreover, we control for three potential 
sources of ideological bias. The first is support for free market economy as a proxy for left-right 
leaning. Second, we look at two measures of support for different normative understandings of 
democracy. The first we call the “conventional understanding”, which entails support for electoral and 
liberal democracy. The second we call the “alternative understanding”, which entails support for 
participatory, liberal or egalitarian types of democracy.23 In order to fix comparisons across coders to 
the same countries and years, we also control for country- and year-fixed effects (results omitted). 
 
Table 8. Predicting coder ratings 
  Clean elections 
Freedom of 
organization Freedom of expression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender –.079 –.018 –.012 –.029 –.060 –.090*** 
 (.050) (.046) (.041) (.041) (.041) (.033) 
Age –.017 –.029* –.004 .002 .004 .004 
 (.013) (.015) (.011) (.012) (.011) (.009) 
Age2 .000 .000** .000 –.000 .000 –.000 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
PhD education –.037 –.028 –.020 –.041 –.039 –.028 
 (.056) (.056) (.039) (.047) (.038) (.036) 
Government employee –.105 –.104 .087 .089 –.085 .082 
 (.088) (.089) (.080) (.080) (.077) (.059) 
Born in country .180*** .145** .085* .082 .060 .068 
 (.065) (.070) (.044) (.053) (.051) (.050) 
Resides in country .020 .005 –.064* –.058 .027 –.023 
 (.062) (.063) (.036) (.045) (.048) (.043) 
Born in Western country –.021 .007 –.083 –.004 –.041 –.041 
 (.070) (.084) (.051) (.060) (.063) (.055) 
Free market support .019 .030 .022* –.007 .031* .006 
 (.021) (.023) (.013) (.015) (.016) (.019) 
Conventional under- –.006 –.014 –.001 –.042 –.002 –.022 
   standing of democracy (.023) (.053) (.015) (.034) (.016) (.032) 
Alternative under-  –.008 .013 –.029* .035 –.033** –.016 
   standing of democracy (.022) (.050) (.015) (.038) (.016) (.031) 
Western country  .135*  –.319***  –.174 
                                                
23 This grouping of the five principles of democracy is supported by a principal component factors analysis run at the coder  
level (results available upon request.). 
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  (.072)  (.085)  (.129) 
Born in Western country  –.084  .115  .125 
   ×Western country  (.121)  (.091)  (.114) 
Openness to trade  .024*  –.020*  –.002 
  (.014)  (.010)  (.010) 
Free market support  –.006*  .002  –.002 
   ×Openness to trade  (.003)  (.003)  (.003) 
Conventional democracy   1.921***  2.890***  2.819*** 
   score  (.322)  (.315)  (.261) 
Conventional under-   .027  .056  .060 
   standing ×score  (.085)  (.060)  (.049) 
Alternative democracy   1.835***  –.243  .903*** 
   score  (.356)  (.349)  (.258) 
Alternative under-   –.075  –.105*  –.025 
   standing ×score  (.075)  (.062)  (.045)        
Country-fixed effects? Y N Y N Y N 
R-squared .211 .458 .104 .299 .161 .545 
No of countries 173 147 174 149 174 149 
No of observations 245,039 160,998 383,763 228,557 635,567 370,224 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: Entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors, clustered on countries, in parentheses. Year and indicator-
fixed effects included but omitted from the table. Models 1, 3 and 5 includes country-fixed effects. 
 
The results in models 1, 3 and 5 are overall comforting. With one exception, coder 
characteristics are not related to how V-Dem experts rate electoral democracy indicators. The exception 
is a tendency among coders born in a country to provide a more positive assessment of election quality 
in that country than non-native experts (independent of country of residence). This is an interesting 
pattern worthy of further inquiry, but it is the exception to the rule: experts do not provide different 
assessments of election quality, freedom of association or of expression, depending on who they are. 
Models 2, 4, and 6, tests for another type of coder bias that Bollen and Paxton (2000, 72) labels 
“situational closeness”. This is the idea that “judges will be influenced by how situationally and 
personally similar a country is to them.“ More specifically, one could imagine that strong believers in 
the free market has no general bias in their rankings but a specific tendency to rate countries with free 
markets better. Similarly, situational closeness bias implies that strong supports of liberal-electoral 
democracy would give overly positive ratings of countries that are strong on liberal-electoral 
democracy; or that believers in other conceptions of democracy rank countries more proximate to their 
ideals more favorably also on the electoral indicators. Finally, this kind of bias could manifest such that 
even if Western coders display no systematic bias in and of themselves, bias might be directed toward 
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non-Western countries. This translates into controlling for interaction effects between particular coder 
and country characteristics.24  
We find no evidence of situational bias in the V-Dem data. The two tendencies that come 
closest to statistical significance at conventional levels are that market believers tend to rate elections as 
of lower quality in countries with more openness to trade (the latter is our proxy for free market 
establishment in practice). This is in the opposite direction from “situational closeness.” The second is 
that supporters of alternative (participatory/deliberative/egalitarian) forms of democracy tend to rate 
countries that are strong on such dimensions lower in terms of freedom of organization. The dominant 
pattern is that situational closeness does not introduce bias in the V-Dem experts’ ratings of electoral 
democracy. 
 
Comparing datasets 
Our second set of validation exercises focus on comparisons between our measure of electoral 
democracy and extant alternatives. Figure 4 displays the bivariate descriptive pattern at country-year 
level, comparing the V-Dem polyarchy index to the Polity and Freedom House ratings, as well as the 
“Unified Democracy scores” (UDS) respectively. The latter is based on just about every pertinent 
measure of electoral democracy covering multiple years and countries (Pemstein et al. 2010). 
Convergance could be said to be the overall pattern. The pairwise correlations range from .85 for 
Polity, .87 for Freedom House civil liberties, .90 for Freedom House political rights, to .93 for the UDS 
ratings. The red smoothed lowess-line of best fit also indicates a consistent pattern of monotonically 
increasing levels of polyarchy, the higher the extant measure of electoral democracy. In the convergent 
validity sense, these different measures thus validate each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
24 This means that we have to drop the country-fixed effects from these models 
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Figure 3. Comparing Polyarchy with Alternative Electoral Democracy Indices 
 
 
 
Note: The red lines are smoothed lowess regression lines of best fit. 
 
However, one could also argue that the many and sometimes fairly large deviations is more eye-
opening. In particular Polity and Freedom House regularly produces scores that differs significantly 
from the V-Dem polyarchy index. Evidence presented in Table 9 refute two potential explanations for 
these deviations that, if they were true, would cast doubt over the V-Dem measure. The first is the 
potential effects of coder characteristics, but now in terms of the extent to which differences between 
the V-Dem polyarchy measure and Polity or Freedom House can be explained by the aggregate 
composition of coders for each country, estimated as the average coder characteristics at the country-
year level. To avoid potential ecological fallacy bias (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993), we also control for 
the individual-level tendencies unraveled in Table 8. Second, we assess whether differences can be 
explained by three other prime suspects of the V-Dem data that varies by country and year: the average 
level of disagreement among coders, the number of coders, and the number of bridge/lateral coders. 
To the extent these features of the data collection process systematically predicts deviations from Polity 
and Freedom House, we have a reason to worry about a biased data generating process. 
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Table 9. Predicting deviations from Polity and Freedom House 
 Polity Freedom House 
 Raw scores Absolute Raw scores Absolute 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Polity score 1.949*** –.135***   
 (.076) (.028)   
Freedom House score   2.204*** –.225*** 
   (.064) (.028)        
Coder characteristics:     
Gender –.050** .027** –.058** .015 
 (.024) (.012) (.023) (.011) 
Age –.000 –.003 –.002 .000 
 (.007) (.003) (.007) (.003) 
Age2 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
PhD education –.041* .007 –.045* –.005 
 (.025) (.013) (.024) (.013) 
Government employee .014 .019 –.001 .016 
 (.046) (.027) (.044) (.021) 
Born in country .116*** .002 .073** .017 
 (.036) (.017) (.035) (.016) 
Resides in country –.011 .027 .016 .017 
 (.036) (.017) (.032) (.014) 
Born in Western country –.008 –.070*** –.062** –.058*** 
 (.035) (.019) (.027) (.017) 
Free market support .012 –.001 .002 .001 
 (.011) (.005) (.011) (.005) 
Conventional under- .004 .008 .004 .002 
   standing of democracy (.010) (.005) (.011) (.005) 
Alternative under- –.042*** .008 –.021** .006 
   standing of democracy (.010) (.005) (.010) (.005)        
Coder composition:     
Share female coders –.024 –.084** –.107 –.047 
 (.125) (.040) (.100) (.038) 
Average age of coders .000 .009 .034 –.004 
 (.030) (.015) (.031) (.012) 
Average age2 .000 –.000 –.000 –.000 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Share of PhD coders .133 –.060 –.033 –.022 
 (.086) (.042) (.082) (.032) 
Share of coders employed .054 –.060 –.055 –.066 
   by government (.182) (.076) (.170) (.071) 
Share of coders born .114 .068 –.010 .054 
   in country (.135) (.047) (.095) (.039) 
Share of coders residing .253** –.039 .226** –.110*** 
   in country (.102) (.036) (.091) (.041) 
Share of Western coders .160* .048 .149*** .009 
 (.084) (.031) (.057) (.026) 
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Average free market  .007 .004 .041 –.035** 
   support (.043) (.013) (.032) (.014) 
Average conventional –.047 –.019 –.104** –.007 
   understanding (.057) (.019) (.048) (.018) 
Average alternative –.038 –.026 –.057* –.003 
   understanding (.045) (.016) (.035) (.014)        
Country characteristics:     
Coder disagreement .044 .223*** .054 .214*** 
 (.050) (.015) (.052) (.015) 
No of coders .002 –.002** –.000 –.003*** 
 (.003) (.001) (.002) (.001) 
No of lateral coders .017** –.003 .007 .003 
 (.009) (.005) (.007) (.004)        
R-squared .399 .159 .426 .190 
No of countries 163 163 168 168 
No of observations 930,161 930,161 529,367 529,367 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: Entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors, clustered on countries, in parentheses. Year and indicator-
fixed effects included but omitted from the table. 
 
Overall the evidence is pointing clearly to negative findings. We do not focus on individual-
level characteristics in this analysis, since they simply replicate the results from Table 8 but with 
increased precision (mostly due to the larger sample size). Admittedly, when controlling for these 
individual-level tendencies, there are a few significant aggregate coder composition effects. When a 
large share of coders are born in the countries they are coding, V-Dem rates countries as less 
democratic than both Polity and Freedom House, but with respects to Freedom House this is offset by 
a tendency to produce more similar scores in absolute terms. A large share of coders with alternative 
conceptions of democracy rank countries as less democratic than Polity, but again the substantive effect 
is miniscule (recall that the dependent variable is measured on a 0-4 scale). Coder disagreement at the 
country-year level is one of the few positive predictors of absolute deviations, both from Polity and 
Freedom House. This is noteworthy, but more V-Dem coders shrinks the distance. On the whole, 
evidence clearly suggests that divergences between the V-Dem polyarchy index scores and Polity and 
Freedom House are not due to the composition of our sample of coders, or how these coders assess 
electoral democracy. 
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8. The Added Value: Some Empirical Illustrations 
We first showcase the V-Dem polyarchy index’s development over time in comparison to some of the 
most popular extant indices (here rescaled to vary from 0 to 1). As shown in Figure 4, the new index 
track all of Huntington’s (1991) three waves of democracy, although with differences not seen before. 
First, the first wave in the early 19th century is much less prounced. This is mainly a result of the fact 
that we treat semi-sovereign territories such as colonies on par with independent states. This is an 
important corrective to our understanding of the level and development of democracy in the world. 
Polity (along with all other historical regime datasets we are aware of) portrays the state of democracy 
only in the part of the world that consisted of independent states. As we know, in the early 20th century 
a vast majority of the world’s populations lived under colonial rule. V-Dem’s measure of polyarchy 
reflects also how oppressive these empires were, not only the level of electoral democracy of the core, 
independent states. This also provides a unique opportunity that no other dataset offers. We can for the 
first time analyze moves toward independence as processes of democratization (which they often were).   
Second, in contrast to other indices, the V-Dem polyarchy index show a much more gradual 
second wave stretching into the 1960s rather than ending abruptly after the Second World War, and 
display very few signs of a reversed second wave. Rather, the level of electoral democracy in the world 
seemed to have been leveled out prior to the start of the third wave in the 1980s. The reasons for this 
need yet to be fully explored but both the fact that V-Dem measures also semi-sovereign territories and 
that the polyarchy index captures aspects beyond the partial, electoralist components covered by Polity 
are prime suspects. 
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Figure 4. Aggregate Trends in the Major Democracy Indices 
 
 
Note: Polity and Freedom House have been rescaled to vary from 0-1 by using their theoretical maxima and minima. 
UDS, lacking such theoretically defined maxima and minima, has been converted using the empirical counterparts. 
 
 
As compared to Polity, the V-Dem polyarchy measure tends to come out as a more 
conservative measure of electoral democracy. Our inclusion of a suffrage component that is much 
more demanding most likely explains part of this (as is the case of Boix, Miller and Rosato 2012), yet 
differences persist even today and seems also affected by the V-Dem index having a higher standard for 
in particular free and fair elections. As compared to Freedom House, the probably second most used 
graded indicator of electoral democracy, the most notable difference is that the V-Dem polyarchy index 
does not display a downward trend in the last decade. The more exact reasons for this also deserves 
further study. 
An added feature of the V-Dem polyarchy index, as noted above, is that we not only provide 
point estimates but also uncertainty estimates. In Figure 5, we display the ranking of countries in our 
sample in the year of 2010, from lowest to highest degree of polyarchy, together with 1 standard 
deviation confidence intervals. In this particular year, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, 
Swaziland, Laos, Qatar and China score at the very bottom, whereas Switzerland, United States and 
France are ranked highest (in a large group of mostly Western established democracies that by the 
confidence intervals are indistinguishable in terms of polyarchy scores). The margins of measurement 
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error tend to be largest in the middle (cf. Treier and Jackman 2008), which both makes intuitive sense 
(these are more unstable conditions) and in line with the finding reported above that coders disagree 
more in the “muddled middle”. 
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Figure 5. Polyarchy in 2010 
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As a final illustration of the added value of our new Polyachy index, we will highlight the 
potential insights gained from disaggregation. A long-standing debate in the social sciences concerns 
whether economic development, as originally hypothesized by Lipset (1959), is a driver of democratic 
development. Probably due to the lack of appropriate, disaggregated data very little attention has been 
paid to the possibility that economic development could be driving certain components of electoral 
democracy, but not others (for a notable exception, see Aidt & Jensen 2014; 2016). If we unbundle the 
different components of electoral democracy, do we get different results with respect to the overall 
modernization effect? 
In Figure 6, we show the results of a series of dynamic panel regressions with this purpose in 
mind. To address potential endogeneity issues, each model includes one lag of the dependent variable, 
as well as the lag of ln(GDP/capita) (data from Madison). We also control for both country- and year-
fixed effects to address concerns of omitted variable bias.25 
Figure 6. Economic development, polyarchy and its components 
 
 
Note: Entries are regression coefficients for the effects of lagged ln(GDP/capita), controlling for year- and country-fixed 
effects and one lagged dependent variable. 
                                                
25 With an average time series components of 55 years per country, Nickel bias should not be of great concern (Beck & 
Katz 2011). 
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Concentrating on the short-term effects of ln(GDP/capita), the results show a significant 
general effect on polyarchy in this sample of countries. When we “drill down” one level, however, we 
find that this result is driven by two electoral components of the polyarchy index – elected officials and 
free and fair elections – whereas the freedom components (freedom of organization and expression) 
are only weakly linked to economic development, and suffrage even negatively so. In other words, 
modernization does not seem to be driving “liberalization”, in O’Donnell & Schmitter’s (1986) terms, 
but rather more full “transitions” to establishing the fuller set of electoral institutions. The more exact 
reasons for this are discussed in more detail elsewhere (Knutsen et al. 2015). 
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper presents a fresh index of electoral democracy. We argue that it has several advantages over 
existing measures typically used in academic as well as policy analyses. The new V-Dem index is firmly 
anchored in democratic theory capturing all necessary institutions following Dahl’s (1971, 1989, 1998) 
theory of polyarchy that we argue has almost universal acceptance today. Second, the five components 
with their respective indices and their constituent, detailed and precise 36 indicators makes it possible 
to drill down into what exactly drives changes in scores. This transparency and detail also makes it 
possible for the first time to disaggregate analyses of factors such as economic development’s 
relationships to different components of democracy, and it also allow end users to instead draw on 
more minimalist conceptions of electoral democracy should that be more motivated by their research 
questions.  
The V-Dem measure of electoral democracy relies on a unique data generating process. Over 
2,600 academic and other experts provided ratings in their special areas of expertise for particular 
countries according to a fully detailed protocol. Aggregation of country expert ratings is done using 
state-of-the-art Bayesian ordinal item-response theory modeling addressing many thorny issues 
regarding cross-country, and cross-rater comparability while also making it possible for V-Dem to 
provide measures of uncertainty associated with each country-year observation. Bayesian factor analysis 
is employed also to aggregation of indicators to component indices, preserving adequate information of 
measurement uncertainty. 
Finally, several tests of validity of the V-Dem polyarchy index strengthen our belief that it is by 
and large not driven by biases stemming from coder characteristics or ideological predilections. There is 
a fair amount of coder agreement for individual country-year indicators, and deviations from that 
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pattern can be meaningfully understood. We find strong correlation with other existing measures of 
electoral democracy, but also meaningful differences, that cannot be easily explained by features of the 
V-Dem data generating process such as the composition of coders for particular countries. 
It is our hope that this new resource will prove useful to scholars to bring forward new and 
more robust knowledge on the causes and consequences of democratization as well as democracy. It is 
a tall agenda and one that we as an academic community have been involving ourselves in for 60 years 
now. We are not so delusional that we think this new measure will lead to the solutions for all our 
research problems, but we hope it will contribute to clearing some.  
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Appendix A 
The sample of fully completed V-Dem countries and coding periods 
 
Afghanistan, 1900-2012 
Albania, 1912-2012   
Algeria, 1900-2012   
Angola, 1900-2012 
Argentina, 1900-2012   
Armenia, 1990-2012  
Australia, 1901-2012 
Austria, 1918-1938, 1945-2012 
Azerbaijan, 1990-2012   
Bangladesh, 1971-2012  
Belarus, 1990-2012  
Belgium, 1900-2012  
Benin, 1900-2012   
Bhutan, 1900-2012   
Bolivia, 1900-2012 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992-2012 
Botswana, 1900-2012 
Brazil, 1900-2012  
Burkina Faso, 1919-1932, 1947-2012 
Burma/Myanmar, 1900-2012  
Burundi, 1916-2012  
Cambodia, 1900-2012   
Cameroon, 1961-2012  
Canada, 1900-2012 
Cape Verde, 1900-2012 
Central African Republic, 1920-2012  
Chad, 1920-2012  
Chile, 1900-2012  
China, 1900-2012 
Colombia, 1900-2012   
Comoros, 1900-1945, 1991-2012 
Congo, Democratic Republic, 1900-2012 
Congo, Republic, 1903-2012  
Costa Rica, 1900-2012 
Croatia, 1941-1945, 1991-2012 
Cuba, 1902-2012 
Cyprus, 1900-2012 
Czech Republic, 1918-2012 
Denmark, 1900-2012  
Djibouti, 1900-2012   
Dominican Republic, 1900-2012 
Ecuador, 1900-2012 
Egypt, 1900-2012  
El Salvador, 1900-2012  
Eritrea, 1900-2012 
Estonia, 1918-1940, 1990-2012 
Ethiopia, 1900-2012   
Fiji, 1900-2012 
 
Finland, 1900-2012 
France, 1900-2012 
Gabon, 1910-2012   
Gambia, 1900-2012   
Georgia, 1990-2012  
German Democratic Republic, 1945-1990 
Germany, 1900-1945, 1949-2012 
Ghana, 1902-2012   
Greece, 1900-2012 
Guatemala, 1900-2012 
Guinea, 1900-2012   
Guinea-Bissau, 1900-2012 
Guyana, 1900-2012   
Haiti, 1900-2012   
Honduras, 1900-2012 
Hungary, 1918-2012 
Iceland, 1900-2012 
India, 1900-2012   
Indonesia, 1900-2012  
Iran, 1900-2012 
Iraq, 1920-2012 
Ireland, 1919-2012 
Israel, 1948-2012 
Italy, 1900-2012 
Ivory Coast, 1900-2012  
Jamaica, 1900-2012 
Japan, 1900-2012   
Jordan, 1922-2012   
Kazakhstan, 1990-2012 
Kenya, 1900-2012 
Korea, North, 1945-2012 
Korea, South, 1900-2012 
Kosovo, 1999-2012   
Kyrgyzstan, 1990-2012   
Laos, 1900-2012 
Latvia, 1920-1940, 1990-2012 
Lebanon, 1918-2012   
Lesotho, 1900-2012 
Liberia, 1900-2012 
Libya, 1934-1942, 1951-2012  
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Lithuania, 1918-1940, 1990-2012 
Macedonia, 1991-2012  
Madagascar, 1900-2012 
Malawi, 1900-2012 
Malaysia, 1900-2012 
Maldives, 1900-2012 
Mali, 1900-2012   
Mauritania, 1904-2012   
Mauritius, 1900-2012 
Mexico, 1900-2012 
Moldova, 1990-2012 
Mongolia, 1911-2012 
Montenegro, 1900-1918, 1998-2012 
Morocco, 1912-2012   
Mozambique, 1900-2012   
Namibia, 1900-2012   
Nepal, 1900-2012 
Netherlands, 1900-2012 
New Zealand, 1900-2012   
Nicaragua, 1900-2012   
Niger, 1922-2012 
Nigeria, 1914-2012 
Norway, 1900-2012 
Pakistan, 1947-2012 
Palestine/British Mandate, 1918-1948 
Palestine/Gaza, 1948-1967, 2007-2012 
Palestine/West Bank, 1948-1950, 1967-
   2012 
Panama, 1903-2012 
Papua New Guinea, 1900-2012 
Paraguay, 1900-2012 
Peru, 1900-2012 
Philippines, 1900-2012  
Poland, 1918-1939, 1944-2012 
Portugal, 1900-2012 
Qatar, 1900-2012 
Romania, 1900-2012 
Russia, 1900-2012   
Rwanda, 1916-2012  
Sao Tome and Principe, 1900-2012 
Saudi Arabia, 1932-2012  
Senegal, 1904-2012  
Serbia, 1900-2012 
Seychelles, 1903-2012  
Sierra Leone, 1900-2012 
Slovakia, 1939-1945, 1993-2012 
Slovenia, 1989-2012 
Solomon Islands, 1900-2012   
Somalia, 1900-2012   
Somaliland, 1900-1960, 1991-2012 
South Africa, 1900-2012 
South Sudan, 2011-2012 
South Yemen, 1900-1990 
Spain, 1900-2012   
Sri Lanka, 1900-2012   
Sudan, 1900-2012 
Suriname, 1900-2012   
Swaziland, 1900-2012 
Sweden, 1900-2012 
Switzerland, 1900-2012 
Syria, 1918-1920, 1922-2012  
Taiwan, 1900-2012  
Tajikistan, 1990-2012  
Tanzania, 1900-2012 
Thailand, 1900-2012  
Timor-Leste, 1900-2012 
Togo, 1916-2012 
Trinidad and Tobago, 1900-2012 
Tunisia, 1900-2012 
Turkey, 1900-2012 
Turkmenistan, 1990-2012 
Uganda, 1900-2012  
Ukraine, 1990-2012 
United Kingdom, 1900-2012 
United States, 1900-2012 
Uruguay, 1900-2012  
Uzbekistan, 1990-2012 
Vanuatu, 1906-2012 
Venezuela, 1900-2012   
Vietnam, Democratic Republic, 1945-2012 
Vietnam, Republic of, 1902-1975 
Yemen, 1918-2012 
Zambia, 1911-2012   
Zimbabwe, 1900-2012 
Appendix B 
List of V-Dem variables used in operationalizing polyarchy 
 
There are three different types of V-Dem indicators: Type (A) data is more factual and coded by 
Research Assistants connected to the project under the supervision of Principal Investigators and 
Project Managers. Type (A+B) data is gathered from country-specific sources by Country 
Coordinators under the supervision of centrally employed Research Assistants. Type (C) data 
requires a larger degree of judgment about the state of affairs obtaining in a particular country at 
a particular point in time, and is therefore coded by multiple Country Experts. 
 
A. The elected officials index (HOS=head of state, HOG=head of government): 
v2expathhs/hg – HOS/HOG appointment in practice (A+B): How did the head of 
state/government reach office? (HOS: 0=coup/rebellion, appointed by 1=foreign power, 
2=ruling party [in one-party system], 3=royal council, 4=hereditary succession, appointed by 
5=the military, 6=legislature, 7=directly elected, 8=other; HOG: 0=coup/rebellion, appointed by 
1=foreign power, 2=ruling party [in one-party system], 3=royal council, 4=hereditary succession, 
appointed by 5=the military, 6=head of state, 7=legislature, 8=directly elected, 9=other) 
 
v2exaphos/hog – HOS/HOG selection by legislature in practice (A+B): Was approval of 
the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state/government? (0=no, 1=yes) 
 
v2exhoshog – HOS = HOG (A*): Is the head of state (HOS) also head of government (HOG)? 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
 
v2exdfcbhs_rec/v2exdjcbhg – HOS/HOG appoints cabinet in practice (C): In practice, does 
the head of state/government have the power to appoint – or is the approval of the head of 
state/government necessary for the appointment of – cabinet ministers? (HOS: 0=no, 1=yes, but 
only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit 
confirmation by the legislature; or yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by 
the legislature, 2=yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature, but only with respect 
to the head of the cabinet; or yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature; HOG: 
0=no, 1= yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature, 2=yes, 
without any need for confirmation by the legislature) 
 
  47 
v2exdfdmhs/v2exdfdshg – HOS/HOG dismisses ministers in practice (C): If the head of 
state/government took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed? 
(0=no, 1= yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to 
specific events, 2=yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions, 3=yes, at his/her own 
discretion and without restrictions) 
 
v2lgbicam – Legislature bicameral (A*): How many chambers does the legislature contain? 
(0=0, 1=1, 2=2, 3=other, 4=unable to determine, 5-6=NA) 
 
v2lgdomchm – Legislature dominant chamber (C): If the legislature is bicameral, which 
chamber is dominant? (0=lower clearly more dominant, 1=lower somewhat more on most issues, 
2=roughly co-equal, 3=upper somewhat more on most issues, 4=upper clearly more dominant) 
 
v2lgello/v2lgelecup – Lower/Upper chamber elected (B/A): What percentage of the 
lower/upper chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections? (%) 
 
B. The clean elections index: 
v2elembaut – EMB autonomy (C): Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have 
autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national 
elections? (0=no, controlled by ruling body, 1=some autonomy on some issues but not critical 
ones, 2=some autonomy but also partial, 3=acts impartially almost all the time, 4=autonomously 
and impartially applies election laws and administrative rules) 
v2elembcap – EMB capacity (C): Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient 
staff and resources to administer a well-run national election? (0=glaring deficits in staff, 
financial, or other resources, 1=deficits not glaring but seriously compromise organization, 
2=might be serious deficiencies but could also be product of human error, 3=partial deficits in 
resources but not serious or widespread, 4=adequate staff and other resources) 
v2elrgstry – Election voter registry (C): In this national election, was there a reasonably 
accurate voter registry in place and was it used? (0=no registry used, 1=fundamentally flawed 
registry/20% or more eligible voters could have been disenfranchised, 2=uncertain if potential 
flaws had impact, 3=imperfect registry but less than 10% of eligible voters may have been 
disenfranchised, 4=reasonably accurate/less than 1% were affected by any flaws) 
v2elvotbuy – Election vote buying (C): In this national election, was there evidence of vote 
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and/or turnout buying? (1=systematic, widespread by almost all parties/candidates, 2=non-
systematic but common, 3=money and/or personal gifts distributed by parties, 4=limited use of 
money and gifts, 5=no evidence of vote/turnout buying) 
v2elirreg – Election other voting irregularities (C): In this national election, was there 
evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote 
fraud? (0=systematic and almost nationwide, 1=non-systematic but rather common, 2=limited 
and sporadic, 3=limited and many probably unintentional, 4=no evidence of intentional 
irregularities) 
v2elintim – Election government intimidation (C): In this national election, were opposition 
candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or 
harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents? (0=strong intimidation and 
repression during election period, 1=systematic, frequent and violent harassment of opposition, 
2=periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated harassment, 3=sporadic violent 
harassment directed at only 1 or 2 branches of opposition, 4=no harassment or intimidation) 
v2elpeace – Election other electoral violence(C): In this national election, was the campaign 
period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (not by the government, the 
ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns 
(but not conducted by the government and its agents)? (0=widespread violence occurring 
throughout election period, or intense period of more than a week resulting in large number of 
deaths or displaced persons, 1=violence resulting in a few deaths or persons forced to move 
temporarily, 2=outbursts of violence limited to a day or two, 3=few isolated acts involving few 
people, 4=no election-related violence) 
v2elfrfair – Election free and fair (C): Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, 
and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free 
and fair? (0=not at all, 1=not really/some irregularities may have affected outcome, 2=substantial 
competition but some significant irregularities, 3=deficiencies and irregularities but did not in the 
end affect outcome, 4=some human error but largely unintentional without consequences) 
C. The freedom of organization index: 
v2psparban – Party ban (C): Are any parties banned? (0=all parties except state-sponsored 
party, 1=elections are non-partisan/no official parties, 2=many parties, 3=only a few, 4=none) 
v2psbars – Barriers to parties (C): How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party? 
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(0=parties not allowed, 1=impossible for non government-affiliated parties to form, 
2=significant obstacles, 3=modest barriers, 4=no substantial barriers) 
v2psoppaut – Opposition parties autonomy (C): Are opposition parties independent and 
autonomous of the ruling regime? (0=not allowed, 1=opposition parties selected or co-opted by 
ruling regime, 2=some independent, autonomous opposition parties, 3=most significant 
opposition parties are autonomous, 4=all opposition parties are independent) 
v2elmulpar – Elections multiparty (C): Was this national election multiparty? (0=no-party or 
single-party, 1=no-party or single-party but multiple candidates from same party contest 
legislative seats or presidency, 2=at least one real opposition party allowed but competition 
constrained, 3=multiparty but competition prevented for at least one opposition party or by 
conditions such as civil unrest, 4=multiparty elections, though a few marginal parties may not be 
permitted) 
v2cseeorgs – CSO entry and exit (C): To what extent does the government achieve control 
over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life? (0=monopolistic 
control/only government-sponsored orgs allowed to engage in political activity, repression of 
those who defy, 1=substantial control/government licenses all CSOs, active repression of those 
who defy, 2=moderate control/at least some orgs play an active political role, government does 
not or cannot repress them, 3=minimal control/constitutional provisions to ban anti-democratic 
movements, 4=unconstrained/government does not impede formation and operation)  
v2csreprss – CSO repression (C): Does the government attempt to repress civil society 
organizations (CSOs)? (0=no/free to organize, 1=weakly/government uses material sanctions, 
2=moderately/material sanctions and minor legal harassment, 3=substantially/material sanctions, 
minor legal harassments, and arrests of oppositional CSO participants acting lawfully, 
4=severely/violently and actively pursues all members of CSOs) 
D. Suffrage: 
V2x_suffr – Suffrage Index (A): This question applies to citizens only and does not take into 
consideration restrictions based on age, residence, citizenship, having been convicted for crime, 
being legally incompetent, or belonging to particular occupational groups such as the clergy, the 
armed forces, or election officials. It covers legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may 
be operative in practice (de facto). Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage 
is coded as 50%. The absence of an electoral regime in the year (as defined v2elecreg) is coded 
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0%. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply such as property, tax payments, income, 
education, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or ‘economic independence’, rough estimates are 
reported. They are based on the number and character of qualifying criteria that are generally 
translated into percentages in the following ways (if only male suffrage): property/income/taxes 
and education = 5%; property/income/taxes = 10%; education or property/income/taxes = 
20%; ‘economic dependency = 40%. If available, numbers of eligible or registered voters and 
information on population distribution are used to qualify the estimates. 
C. The freedom of expression index: 
v2mecenefm – Print/broadcast censorship effort(C): Does the government directly or 
indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media? (0=attempts are routine, 1=attempts 
are limited to especially sensitive issues, 2=rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and 
if attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.)  
v2meharjrn  – Harassment of journalists(C): Are individual journalists harassed - i.e., 
threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed -- by governmental or powerful 
nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities? (0=No journalists dare 
engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors, 1=some journalists engage, but 
most are almost always forced to stop, 2=rare for any journalist to be harassed, and if they were, 
those responsible for harassment would be identified and punished, 3=journalists are never 
harassed by governmental or powerful non-governmental actors) 
v2meslfcen – Media self-censorship(C): Is there self-censorship among journalists when 
reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive? (0= complete and 
thorough, 1= common but incomplete, 2= occurs only on a few highly sensitive political issues, 
3=little or none) 
v2cldiscm/v2cldiscw  – Freedom of discussion for men/women(C): Are men/women able to 
openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? (0=not respected/harsh and 
immediate intervention, 1=weakly respected/frequently exposed to intervention or harassment, 
2=somewhat respected/occasionally exposed to intervention or harassment, 3=mostly 
respected/minor restraints on expression in private sphere, linked to few cases or to soft 
sanctions, 4=fully respected/unrestricted freedom of expression) – these two items are strongly 
correlated (r=.81) and hence averaged into v2x_cldisc before proceeding. 
v2clacfree – Freedom of academic and cultural expression (C): Is there academic freedom 
and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues? (0=not respected/censorship and 
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intimidation are frequent, 1=weakly respected/practiced occasionally but direct criticism of 
government mostly repressed, 2=somewhat respected/practiced routinely but strong criticism of 
government sometimes repressed, 3=mostly respected/few limitations and sanctions infrequent 
and soft, 4=fully respected/no restrictions) 
v2mebias – Media bias (C): Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates? 
(0=coverage of only official party or candidates, no coverage, or no opposition to cover, 1=cover 
more than one official party but all opposition receives only negative coverage, 2=cover 
opposition, but give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate, 
3=cover opposition, but give an exaggerated amount of coverage to governing party, 4=cover all 
newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to newsworthiness) 
v2mecrit – Print/broadcast media critical (C): Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how 
many routinely criticize the government? (0=none, 1=a few marginal outlets, 2=some important 
outlets but some important outlets that never do, 3=all major media outlets at least occasionally) 
v2merange – Print/broadcast media perspectives (C): Do the major print and broadcast 
media represent a wide range of political perspectives? (0=only the government’s perspective, 
1=represents only perspectives of government and government-approved, semi-official 
opposition party, 2=a variety of political perspectives represented but systematically ignore at 
least one that is important to society, 3=all perspectives that are important in this society are 
represented in at least one major media) 
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Appendix C 
Distributions of component indices∗ 
 
Figure C1. The Elected Officials Index (n=16,376 country years) 
 
 
 
  
                                                
∗ The following graphs displaying distributions were produced using v4 of the V-Dem dataset, but there would be no 
substantive differences using v5. 
0
5
10
15
20
De
ns
ity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Elected Officials
  53 
Figure C2. The Clean Elections Index (n=3,281 election years) 
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Figure C3. Transforming the Clean Elections Index 
 
 
 
Figure C4. The Normalized Clean Elections Index (n=16,317) 
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Figure C5. The Normalized Freedom of Organization Index (n=16,172) 
 
 
 
Figure C6. The Suffrage Indicator (n=16,474) 
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Figure C7. The Normalized Freedom of Expression Index (n=15,969) 
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